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Shamanism, Spiritual Transformation and the Ethical  
Obligations of the Dying Person: 
A Narrative Approach 
Ellen W. Klein 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The person experiencing chronic or protracted illness is 
confronted with a complex array of physical, emotional and spiritual 
trials.  This thesis explores how chronic illness can be viewed through 
the lens of the shamanic experience of dismemberment and re-
memberment and shows how clinical, narrative, and relational models 
on their own are insufficient to speak meaningfully to illness 
experiences, but the integration of aspects of each of these models 
when coupled with shamanic initiation experience creates an 
innovative model for patients and those with whom they are in 
relationship. 
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Introduction 
 Narratives aren‟t just the stories we tell our children at night. 
They are the stories we tell ourselves, the stories that help us make 
sense out of and find meaning in our experiences.  They are also the 
stories we tell others in cathartic efforts to externally order moments 
of internal chaos and communicate who and what we are becoming as 
a result of our experiences.  Illness in particular has the ability to 
disrupt the life story but as Arthur Frank in his work The Wounded 
Storyteller suggests, “the ill person who turns illness into story 
transforms fate into experience” (xi).  But what kind of story can the 
chronically ill person tell that will fully and meaningfully articulate the 
experience of dying slowly through a series of seemingly endless 
exacerbations and reprieves?  What story can the chronically ill body 
tell that has the power of spiritual transformation even in the face of 
death? 
 One of the earliest known genres of stories in which illness 
becomes a vehicle for spiritual transformation is that of the shaman 
found originally in tribal societies among the peoples of Siberia and 
Manchuria.  At the roots of medicine, religion, and the hero‟s journey, 
Shamanism has made a significant historical contribution across 
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cultures to the human experience.  At some point in life each person 
experiences a failure or crisis of some sort and, for this reason, the 
initiation experience, according to Mircea Eliade in his work Rites and 
Symbols of Initiation  “lies at the core of any genuine human life” 
(135).   The shaman‟s initiation experience represents a kind of 
spiritual death and rebirth, acting as an ancient rite of passage 
marking transition from one state of being to another, from the novice 
to the initiated.   The passage from childhood to adulthood, for 
example, is a natural transition recognized in many cultures even 
today.  The shaman‟s initiation is something more than developmental 
transition, however.  It is intense, tortuous, even violent and, I will 
argue, remarkably similar to the experience of the person ravaged by 
disease.   
 Mircea Eliade, in his classic work on shamanism, recounts a 
shaman‟s spiritual transformation as part of a near death experience 
brought on by smallpox.  During his experience, he leaves his body, 
enters the realm of spiritual beings, is instructed in the knowledge of 
plants used in healing and then sees himself being torn apart, his 
bones strewn everywhere and then collected and put back together 
again. Life is breathed back into his body and then he is sent back as a 
healer to his people and awakens in his hut, back in the earthly realm. 
Through his illness and near death experience, the shaman is torn 
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apart, re-membered, and ultimately transfigured (Eliade, 1964, pp.38-
42).  Indeed, he is given three new bones that enable him to heal and 
communicate between the physical and spiritual realms. Having 
attained spiritual insight and wisdom through his encounter with 
death, the shaman is transformed into a healer and spiritual guide, 
capable for example of leaving his body at will, foretelling the future, 
healing the sick, and rescuing lost souls.  The shaman‟s initiation 
experience, I believe, is uniquely suited for the chronically ill as a story 
through which their wounded bodies can speak. As Frank‟s work 
suggests, the fate of illness becomes the experience of spiritual 
transformation (xi).  “The disease that sets the body apart from others 
becomes, in the story, the common bond of suffering that joins bodies 
in their shared vulnerability” (Frank, xi). 
 In this thesis, I will chronicle the ebb and flow of protracted 
illness as a spiritual process of dismemberment and re-memberment, 
examining the aspects of responsibility to intimate others.  I will argue 
that the experience of chronic or protracted illness must not be 
reduced to little more than a clinical event because it is not only a 
physical but also spiritual process represented best through narratives 
and understood better as an opportunity for spiritual transformation as 
described in the shaman‟s experience through which the sick may 
discover meaning.  My thesis is that in order to fully understand the 
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nature of the illness experience, we must explore the spiritual 
dimension. I will argue that the spiritual component of the shaman‟s 
initiation experience may provide clues for understanding illness as 
spiritually transformative even in the absence of physical healing, and 
that obligation to intimate others is critical to that transformative 
experience. 
 I have come to understand my own experience of chronic illness 
as a mirror of the shaman‟s spiritual experience of dismemberment 
and re-memberment.  Each relapse is a death. The succession of 
relapses is felt like a series of tiny deaths, and in those moments of 
crisis, the physical and emotional despair is so keen that death would 
be a welcome release.  Yet my feeling of obligation to others who care 
about me and about whom I care will not let me give up.  To abandon 
my relationships and the obligations embedded in them would be to 
relinquish a critical part of what it means to be human.  The face of my 
daughter appears before eyes squeezed shut in an effort to escape the 
circumstance in which I find myself.  In spite of everything, I am 
wooed by her, by my commitment to her and my obligation to those 
others that I love who hold a claim on me as well. My relationships call 
out to me, their voices the only thing more audible than my despair.  
Bound by the claim they have on me, spiritual re-memberment begins 
with that pivotal moment in which what is required of me supersedes 
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my desire to give up.  Like the shaman, I find my experience has the 
power to transform rather than annihilate. 
 The following narrative account illustrates a moment of 
exacerbation in my own experience of chronic illness.  At the time, I 
could not know for certain that I would recover or that, even if I did, I 
would resemble my former self in any recognizable way. 
It is inconceivable that I can have no feeling from the waist 
down, no appreciable feeling that would allow me to use my 
limbs, but I have pain, excruciating pain.  Remember that I have 
had a child, experienced the primal pain of labor.  Labor has 
nothing on this.  This burns and sears and fires off rounds of 
electricity from my back, around my torso and down into my 
legs.  It vibrates in concerto with the spasms in my muscles.   It 
does not relent, does not even ebb like the contractions of labor, 
and worst of all I cannot see hope of birthing something 
beautiful from this.  I am not one brought often to tears for 
myself, but they stream in hot rivulets down my cheeks and 
hopelessness begins to take up residence.  I do not want to see 
anyone.  I do not want to be seen. 
 The contingent nature of my disease process leaves me dangling 
precariously by the thread of “the law of thirds.”  With each 
exacerbation, I am confronted with a third of a chance that I will 
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recover all I have lost physically, some of what I have lost, or none.  
And with each exacerbation something of my former self is changed 
emotionally and spiritually.  I am never the same person I was before 
the relapse no matter what I may gain physically.  I am not the 
mother, wife, friend or colleague I was before.  I am, whether I want 
to be or not, changed by my experience.  Illness makes an indelible 
mark on my life.   
 The person experiencing chronic or protracted illness is 
confronted with a complex array of physical, emotional and spiritual 
trials.  This thesis will explore how chronic illness can be viewed 
through the lens of the shamanic experience of dismemberment and 
re-memberment and show how clinical, narrative, and relational 
models on their own are insufficient to speak meaningfully to illness 
experiences, but the integration of aspects of each of these models 
when coupled with shamanic experience creates an innovative model 
for patients and those with whom they are in relationship. 
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Illness as Clinical Experience 
 Protracted illness presents a unique problem for patients, 
caregivers, physicians and ethicists and, in particular, is 
comprehended most often within a clinically, medically, and physically 
oriented paradigm.  This is evident in the current scholarly debate in 
which illness is primarily viewed through a clinical lens that focuses on 
the tension between paternalism and autonomy in medical decision-
making.  Until the middle of the twentieth century, the emphasis was 
solely on paternalism but has shifted since then to an equally radical 
focus on autonomy.  The emphasis on absolute autonomy in medical 
decision-making however has resulted in an over emphasis on patient 
rights that communicates a problematic degree of personal freedom 
and subsequently ignores the experience and expertise of clinicians.   
 Two voices are most prominent in this debate.  Robert Veatch 
and Edmund Pellegrino arguably represent the most noted and 
respected scholarship in medical ethics.  While Veatch more strongly 
represents the sentiments of autonomy and Pellegrino aspects of 
paternalism, both have shifted their approach to the fulcrum between 
the two extremes and make the case for the benefits of representing 
elements of each in the medical ethical aspect of the illness 
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experience.  The danger of focusing on one to the exclusion of the 
other is the potential for an imbalance in decision-making power.  
Paternalism unchecked by patient autonomy has the power to over-
ride self–determination or personal narrative, rendering medical 
decisions that may lack relevance for the patient.  While incorporating 
the experience and expertise of the practitioner, absolute paternalism 
risks dictating clinical outcomes that lack language sufficient to 
communicate hopefulness or reasoning that would inspire patient 
compliance.  This kind of paternalism risks excluding the patient from 
the process and may therefore, do more harm than good.   
 The risks of absolute autonomy carry equal weight.  Placing 
decision-making entirely in the hands of patients disregards the 
experience and expertise brought by practitioners to the process.  In 
the same way that paternalism exercised in its absolute form by 
practitioners through clinical decision-making may unwittingly excuse 
patients from the work and responsibilities that are a natural part of 
being human, autonomy risks outcomes in which the patient may 
excuse him or herself, thereby ceding to the disease process crucial 
aspects of personhood. As a result, the illness rather than the person 
with the illness takes center stage.  
 Although they once were at nearly opposite ends of the 
spectrum, Robert Veatch and Edward Pellegrino have come to balance 
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the strengths and weaknesses of paternalism and autonomy by using 
virtue ethics and the ethic of beneficence as complementary mediators 
between the two extremes.  What they bring to the problem is balance 
to the potential harm of absolute forms of both models.  
 Speaking to the need for this balance, Robert Veatch offers an 
alternative to the heavy handed medical paternalism born out of the 
Hippocratic tradition in which the patient and the patient‟s friends and 
family are deemed ignorant because they do “not have the knowledge 
that comes [for physicians] with initiation into the cult [of medicine]‟ 
(Veatch, 59).  “The Hippocratic Oath instructs the clinician, whether 
using his own personal judgment or that of peers, to do what appears 
to benefit the patient-even if the patient is not in agreement or does 
not want the offered benefit” (Veatch, 58).  Here Veatch aptly 
articulates the root problem with forms of absolute paternalism in that 
it makes no room for the concerns of the individual patient, denying 
elements of personal agency.  Subsequently, the patient treated under 
paternalism is confined to a passive, receptive role and denied active 
participation in his or her own care. 
 Veatch points out in his work The Basics of Bioethics that action 
and intent are key concerns in the recent history of medical ethical 
decision making.  He weighs the differences in normative ethics 
between emphasis on beneficence (producing good outcomes) and 
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nonmaleficence (avoiding bad outcomes) in value theory and the 
emphasis on benevolence (willing to do the good) seen in virtue theory 
(Veatch, 6). The physician acting paternalistically under the auspices 
of good intent, while benevolent (willing the good) may not have 
actually been beneficent (doing the good) (Veatch, 7).  This is seen, 
for example, in the physician who avoids truth telling in order to avert 
potential harm to a patient by causing distress.  Since the late 1980‟s, 
a “return to the more traditional interest in the virtuous character of 
the health provider” has emerged (Veatch, 7).  Virtue ethics would 
concern itself with the physician‟s character and his motive or intent in 
choosing to avoid truth telling with a patient, whereas, value theory 
would focus solely on the physician‟s actions, specifically, does the 
physician‟s lie avoid a harmful outcome for the patient.  More 
specifically, the concern is that this paternalistic good intent would 
produce actions that override the aspect of patient autonomy 
understood as the respect for persons (Veatch, 7).  Fortunately, a 
more recent emphasis has been placed on accounting for both the 
actions and character of the physician. This is indicative of the move in 
medical ethics towards balance between the earlier extremes of each 
ethical model and also between individual values of the patient and 
physician. 
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 Although “autonomous reason [has come to function as] the 
cornerstone of secular bioethics,” Edmund Pellegrino does not support 
patient autonomy as the primary concern of medical ethical decision 
making (Pellegrino, 140).  Even though an ethical perspective based 
purely on autonomy is in direct opposition to the Roman Catholic 
religious paradigm that dictates his understanding of the sanctity of 
life, he could certainly not be accused of advocating for absolute 
paternalism either. While Catholicism, he admits, “often is at the most 
extreme pole from the current antimetaphysical biases of 
contemporary bioethics,” he does not advocate for dismissing the 
concerns of individual patients (Pellegrino, 141).  He does this to the 
extent that he believes the job of the clinician healer is to cure when 
possible and to provide hope to patients in despair but not to the 
extent that their “compassion…sanction[s] killing the suffering person 
or helping him to kill himself” (Pellegrino, 121).  For Pellegrino there 
are clearly limits to the degree of autonomy patients should be 
afforded.  Rejecting purely autonomous actions such as euthanasia 
and assisted suicide, Pellegrino calls for clinicians to become “expert[s] 
in palliative care…help[ing] each patient to understand the roots of his 
suffering and try compassionately to remove them” (Pellegrino, 124).  
Like Veatch, he is as interested in the physician‟s character as his or 
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her actions.  Pellegrino summarizes his conception of virtue in ethics in 
the following: 
“Beneficence would be more than nonmaleficence, more than 
avoiding harm or even doing good.  It means doing good even 
when it means sacrifice of self-interest.  Autonomy would focus 
on respect for persons and their dignity as creatures, not on 
some absolute freedom or license to do with our lives what we 
please.  Respect for persons would, indeed, emphasize self-
governing decision making.  But our freedom as creatures of God 
is always within the constraints of ethical and moral 
determinants derived from Scripture, tradition, church teaching, 
and the study of ethics (Pellegrino, 1988, 122-123).   
Pellegrino does something here that Veatch does not.  He offers a very 
personal definition of what it means for the physician to be virtuous 
and the kind of character from which one should expect a physician‟s 
actions to be informed.  
 In The Virtuous Physician and the Ethics of Medicine Pellegrino 
examines the impact of virtue ethics when applied to the role of the 
physician.  He notes a need for balance between action and character 
or intent similar to what is found in Veatch‟s work.   
The more we yearn for ethical sensitivity, the less we lean on 
rights, duties, rules, and principles, and the more we lean on the 
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character traits of the moral agent.  Paradoxically, without rules, 
rights, and duties specifically spelled out, we cannot predict what 
form a particular person‟s expression of virtue will take.  In a 
pluralistic society, we need laws, rules, and principles to assure 
dependable minimum level of moral conduct.  But that minimum 
level is insufficient in the complex and often unpredictable 
circumstances of decision-making, where technical and value 
desiderata intersect so inextricably (Arras and Steinbock, 82-
83). 
For Pellegrino, ethics based in virtue must accompany virtue based in 
rights or law.  Perhaps more importantly, Pellegrino and his colleague 
David Thomasma in their book For the Patient’s Good:  the Restoration 
of Beneficence in Healthcare advocate for what they term 
“beneficence-in-trust”.  Here the concept of beneficence is re-
interpreted to function in the patient /practitioner relationship in such 
a way that patient autonomy compliments rather than competes with 
the practitioner doing the clinical good.  The relationship is defined by 
an element of trust between the parties that each will act in the best 
interests of the other.  This, I believe, is what Pellegrino is talking 
about when, as noted earlier, he says, “[beneficence] is doing good 
even when it means sacrifice of self interest” (Pellegrino, 1988, 122). 
Through dialogue, both practitioner and patient express their wishes 
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and/or concerns and come to understand one another‟s unique 
contribution to the shared decision-making process.  A terminal 
patient, for example, may come to understand the benefit of an 
undesired treatment as a means of decreasing pain or a physician may 
come to accept a patient‟s desire to discontinue a treatment not in 
keeping with their values.  In this way, a patient‟s autonomy can be 
expressed without leaving the patient abandoned in the process, or 
allowing the practitioner to run roughshod over the patient in a radical 
act of paternalism.  Along with Veatch, Pellegrino and Thomasma 
wisely advocate for a combination of compassionate and pragmatic 
ethical approaches rather than one that takes precedence over or 
claims no use for the other.  
 While issues concerning paternalism and autonomy, and value 
and virtue ethics are only a small part of the complex processes of 
medical ethical decision making, my intent here is not to detail the 
many facets of the medical model but rather to point out its major 
focus and highlight the fact that even at its most intricate, the model is 
still not enough.  The balance Robert Veatch and Edmund Pellegrino 
bring to the historical tendency in bioethics towards extremes in the 
ethics of paternalism and autonomy is crucial for both patients and 
practitioners but the danger remains in focusing solely on any of these 
clinical aspects in that alone they are insufficient to speak to the full 
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range of concerns for patients who are not ever simply a disease to be 
managed or clinical outcome to be effected.  Even Veatch notes 
“[physical] health is an important goal, but not the only one” (51).  As 
such, the purely clinical story, however canonical, does not have the 
ability to represent the full experience of illness.   
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Illness as Narrative Experience 
 “Human life is storied life” (Bochner, 73).  In order to 
understand and find meaning in our experiences, we live our lives in 
the context of story, the stories we tell ourselves, and the stories we 
tell others. Darrell Fasching, in his book Comparative Religious Ethics, 
explains the rich history of storytelling as a means by which to 
understand and express meaning found in the full range of human 
experience. 
Life, it has been said, is just a bowl full of stories. As far back as 
we can see into the misty recesses of time and the human 
adventure, human beings have been not only storytellers but 
story dwellers.  Their stories coursed through their veins and 
sinews and came to expression in song and dance.  To this very 
day human beings see and understand the world through the 
lenses of their stories (Fasching, 10). 
 Because we are not clinical beings, but individuals living inside a 
story, illness experiences examined through narrative are understood 
holistically and in greater detail.  Illness is a kind of chaos that disrupts 
our story as we have come to understand it and furthermore disrupts 
our understanding of who we are in that story.  Our lives are 
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interrupted as a consequence of the disruption of our sense of self, 
and who we are or are becoming must be reinterpreted, rewritten.  If 
medicine is to treat the whole person, it must have the whole story. 
For this reason, including the narrative aspect of the individual is 
crucial to understanding the problem of illness.  This aspect is what 
the clinical model, despite its many practical and philosophical 
attributes, lacks.  Rita Charon, a physician, recognized the limits of the 
clinical model and the value of incorporating and listening to the 
stories of patients.  By encouraging the inclusion of patient narrative in 
assessment and treatment, “narrative medicine provides health care 
professionals with practical wisdom in comprehending what patients 
endure in illness and what they themselves undergo in the care of the 
sick” (Charon, vii).  Narrative medicine, she says, acts as a “corrective 
to some of these failings, a support to these emerging strengths, and 
response to these widespread yearnings…to unify and cohere divergent 
aspects of sickness and healthcare” (Charon, ix).   Having so clearly 
made the case for thinking narratively about illness as a complement 
to thinking clinically and as a benefit to both patient and practitioner, 
she has emerged as an authoritative voice in medicine and medical 
ethics, especially for clinicians.   
 As part of listening and thinking narratively, Charon examines 
the problem illness creates for the body and for the sense of self.  The 
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body, she writes, “is proxy for the self…speaks [for] and can be 
observed to constitute the self” (Charon, 86).  As Charon points out, 
“the body… coauthors the story of the life being lived in it” (87).  
“Without the body, the self is an abstraction…cannot be 
uttered…cannot enter [into] relation with others” (Charon, 87-88).  So 
when illness mars the body, it mars also the self inhabiting the body.  
The following narrative vignette is drawn from a subsequent 
exacerbation of illness in which my body was wrecked by dystonia and 
seizures as a result of a lesion on the right hemisphere of my brain 
and illustrates the discord Charon says illness brings to the sense of 
self. 
 Staring in the mirror, I do not recognize myself.  As if 
looking in a funhouse mirror, I have become some distorted and 
grotesque caricature of the person I used to be.  I am not this 
person… this is not me!...the voice of my fading former self 
pleads inside my head….I don‟t know who this is staring back at 
me, but I am angry and frightened by what I see, perhaps more 
so by what I don‟t see, an image reflecting the me I know. My 
face twitches rhythmically wrenching the left side into an ugly 
smirk.  The rest of my left side twitches along with it, my limbs 
curling in on themselves, twisted and torqued into painful 
positions from which I cannot extract myself.  Ripples of 
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contractions roll over my abdomen and ribs and around to my 
back, squeezing me and from my diaphragm producing an 
animal-like grunt. Perhaps that is what I have become…an 
animal.  Surely there is nothing human about the state I am in 
now.  I wait for each wave to pass and wait more anxiously for 
the next one to come in its painful wake, wondering if and when 
it will ever stop.  
Here the distortion of body is so great as to produce a distortion in my 
sense of self.  I cannot “see” myself in this body.  I don‟t want to 
because the divide is too great between who I know myself to be in 
bodily form and who I see in the mirror.  And so, the story I tell of my 
self is halted, discombobulated.  I am in need of a new story to make 
sense of the chaos illness has wreaked not only on my body, but on 
my self.  To borrow Charon‟s language, my corporeal truth must find a 
way to become narrative truth. I need my health care providers as 
clinical partners to see and hear the narrative crisis created by my 
illness, but I too must recognize and listen to the loss experienced by 
the self and through the body.  To do so is to make room for a new 
story of body and self to emerge. 
 Charon‟s work skillfully and beautifully weds the practical, clinical 
demands of practicing medicine with the unfolding stories of patients.  
Together, all of the benefit of clinical intervention is actualized without 
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divorcing the patient from personhood.  Most importantly, her work 
advocates for approaching illness holistically and patients as persons 
not just disease processes to be managed or medical decisions to be 
made. But for the patient whose life story has become no longer 
relevant in the context of illness, what kind of story can the body tell?    
 Arthur Frank brings to the narrative conversation the tales of the 
“wounded storytellers.” He gives the sick a voice,” not just to work out 
their own changing identities, but also to guide others who will follow 
them” (Frank, 17).  The wounded as tellers of story shift from passive 
receivers of care to active givers of care broadening the “circle of 
shared experience” (Frank, xii).  “Because stories can heal, the 
wounded healer and wounded storyteller are not separate, but are 
different aspects of the same figure” (Frank, xii). Frank shifts narrative 
contribution to clinical practice as seen in Charon‟s work to narrative 
ethics as he envisions it: “an ethics of commitment to shaping oneself 
as a human being” (158).  “The personal issue of telling stories about 
illness is to give voice to the body, so that the changed body can 
become once again familiar in these stories” (Frank, 2).  This is no 
easy task.  For while stories can tell about the body, more is required 
to “make sense of illness stories… told [and heard] through the 
diseased body” (Frank, 2-3). Illness stories are not however, only 
personal.  As Frank says, they are also social, for stories are told to 
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and in relationship with others (3).  The very telling of a story, Frank 
says, implies a listener (3). And so for Frank the questions remain, 
what kinds of stories can sick bodies tell and what impact does the 
social context have on their telling? 
 “Disease interrupts a life, and illness then means living with 
perpetual interruption” (Frank, 56).  Frank looks at the kinds of 
narratives through which the sick as “wounded storytellers” manage 
and story the interruption that is illness.  He describes three kinds of 
narratives in which “wounded bodies” are storied: restitution, chaos, 
and quest.  In restitution stories, the sick, least often the chronically 
ill, seek and regain their health.  Chaos narratives are in direct 
opposition to the restitution narrative, in that they 
“negate…expectation [and maintain a plot that] imagines life never 
getting better” (Frank, 97). The quest narrative “meets suffering head 
on, [with the belief] that something is to be gained through the 
experience” (Frank, 115). Each of these stories offers a way to 
navigate towards coherence and make reparation for the damage done 
by illness to the body and the sense of self.  Frank argues that 
different people gravitate to different kinds of stories but whatever the 
choice of narrative; people have a “responsibility for their stories and 
for their bodies” (Frank, 52).  Frank goes on to say that mere “survival 
does not include any particular responsibility other than surviving” 
22 
 
(Frank, 137).  Rather than survivors, the sick, he argues, may become 
witnesses “responsible for telling what has happened and offering 
testimony to a truth that is generally unrecognized or suppressed” 
(Frank, 137). The truth he alludes to is, I believe, what is knowable 
through illness as a transformative spiritual experience, by which I 
mean the discovery of a story that makes sense of one‟s life even in 
the face of death.  The element of testimony, as Frank describes it, is 
not unidirectional, but something that occurs in a “relationship of 
communicative bodies” (Frank, 143).  In witnessing, the sick person as 
wounded storyteller takes responsibility for telling what may be 
uncomfortable or painful, and the listener responsibility for hearing the 
“truth” that may be equally so.  Through rewriting themselves in story, 
the sick are transformed into wounded storytellers and, in relationship, 
testimony transforms the wounded storyteller into the wounded 
healer. 
 Together, the narrative and relational aspects of Charon and 
Frank‟s work act as tools for understanding illness in the context of the 
life stories in which they occur.  Both offer a crucial aspect to 
understanding the illness experience through the narrative framework 
their work provides.  The insightful approaches to illness taken by 
Arthur Frank and Rita Charon provide a basis for examining chronic 
illness and physical brokenness through narrative, challenging as well 
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as augmenting the predominately clinical and theoretical approaches 
to experiences of illness.  
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Illness as Relational Experience 
 As Charon and Frank point out, the illness experience is also a 
relational experience.  An essential component of what it means to be 
human is expressed in our ability to be in relationship.  In the same 
way that the sick are not diseases separated from their person, we are 
not persons completely isolated from others.  And so, the experience 
of chronic or protracted illness as much as it may make us strangers to 
ourselves and to others, must be considered in the context of the 
relationships in which we exist. As we compose the narratives of our 
lives, we do so for ourselves and for our listeners in order to make 
sense of the interruptions that are part of the natural course of life.  
Illness often presents a more acute form of this problem and 
exacerbates the need for a “meaningful story” to make sense of the 
disruption it causes. Certainly, our listeners include the practitioners to 
whom we tell our stories to seek physical healing or comfort, but our 
listeners are also those with whom we are in intimate relationship.  
Relationships with significant others require something of us.  In 
Frank‟s model, we are responsible to one another in the context of 
telling and listening to stories, and for that matter, in the context of 
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memory, but what I would like to suggest here is that responsibility to 
intimate others involves a degree of surrender of self to the other.  
The purely autonomous self that may enjoy full expression of personal 
agency does not exercise a full expression of his or her humanity.  
Relationships have the power to shift our focus from self-centered 
autonomous expressions of singular self pursuit (or what one wants) 
to the self in relationship centered approach that considers the others 
with whom we are in relationship.  The chronically ill person may grasp 
for any expression of self determination in response to the diminished 
sense of self that results from illness, but this produces, I believe, a 
limited and even false sense of what it means to be human.   
 To explore this further, it is helpful to look at what it means to 
be in relationship with others.  Two classic paradigms for 
understanding relationship that have deeply influenced Western 
civilization are found in Aristotle‟s model of friendship and the Judaic 
model of covenant that has its historical origins in the biblical account 
of the Israelites receiving the ten commandment at Mt. Sinai.  It is 
there that God compels the Israelites to enter into a relationship of 
mutual obligation.  God will guide and protect them and they in 
response will keep the law set forth in the commandments given to 
Moses.  The covenant as it is expressed here is more than a mere 
contract between two parties.  It is a trilateral relationship with God as 
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the unseen third party transforming our relationships from the 
mundane to the spiritual.  As Jonathan Sacks describes, covenant is 
more a relationship in which “we open our „I‟ to another‟s „Thou‟ [with] 
God in between [as] that [which] joins self to self through an act of 
covenantal kindness.  That is hesed (kindness), the physical deed in 
which soul touches soul and the universe acquires a personal face” 
(54-55).  
 For Aristotle, friendship functions as the primary model of 
relationship.  In Books VIII and IX of Nichomachean Ethics, he 
explores why we need friendships and how those friendships work.  
While often accused of narcissistic tendencies, Aristotle‟s 
understanding of friendship does imply something helpful for 
understanding our responsibility to one another.  For Aristotle, humans 
are social creatures and friendship a virtuous endeavor, “most 
indispensible for life” (Aristotle, 214).  Friends, he says, “enhance our 
ability to think and to act” (Aristotle, 215).  This is because for 
Aristotle, friends or intimate others act as another self, or another 
myself in whom I can see my actual self more critically and therefore 
more clearly (Aristotle, 266).  As a mirror in which to better see and 
understand ourselves, friends are crucial to the process of self-
knowledge.  We more easily see in others what is difficult to ascertain 
in ourselves in isolation (Aristotle, 264).  Personal autonomy is not a 
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good or outcome with which Aristotle is concerned, for only in 
friendship can we achieve the greatest degree of moral growth.  As he 
says, “friendship is an association or community…[and as friends we] 
become better as [we] are active together and correct one another” 
(Aristotle, 271-272).  These aspects of Aristotelian friendship, in which 
relationship with intimate others, to whom we are indelibly tied, are 
crucial to our understanding of ourselves.  Within these relationships 
we find the place in which we are made better through our 
associations and experience the best kind of personal growth. 
 While Aristotle‟s notion of friendship is helpful for examining the 
relational aspect of illness, the addition of the concept of covenantal 
relationship may better facilitate an understanding of the importance 
responsibility plays in relationship, and even more so in relationships 
with the sick. Indeed, Jonathan Sacks suggests this very notion when 
he says that, “we discover God‟s image in ourself by discerning it in an 
other” (54).  As Victor Frankl declares, “being human means being 
conscious and being responsible” (24).  Embracing Frankl‟s notion, 
Jonathan Sacks equates the exercise of responsibility to others with a 
full expression of humanity and its absence with loss.  He cites the 
failures of Biblical characters such as “Adam who loses paradise [and] 
Noah who declines into drunkenness” as narrative examples of the loss 
experienced as a result of abdicating responsibility and the story of 
28 
 
Babel as an example of what happens when we are responsible to no 
one but ourselves (Sacks, 146).  In an extreme act of hubris, the 
biblical story tells us, the people of Babel “aspire[d] to reach heaven 
by technological prowess rather than moral conduct” and in so doing 
attempted to “take the place of God” (Sacks, 143-144).  What the 
people of Babel, and often we, fail to understand according to Sacks is 
that “the word responsibility comes from the word response [and] 
implies the existence of an other who has legitimate claims on my 
conduct, for, or to, whom I am accountable” (Sacks, 144).  This for 
Sacks is the very underpinning of covenantal relationship.  
Responsibility, says Sacks, “is intrinsically relational” (144).  The story 
of the sick person accountable to no one other than him or herself also 
represents a failure of responsibility.  “The ethical is never private; in 
biblical terms, it is a matter of covenant between two parties, [in the 
story of Babel between] God and humanity” and in the story of the 
sick person, between the sick and their intimate others (Sacks, 144). 
 These two relational models work powerfully together as a 
means for understanding illness as spiritual transformation and 
providing the most helpful articulation of covenantal relationship 
through which to explore the nature of intimate relationships and more 
specifically the concept of responsibility between intimate others with 
whom we are in relationship. For Sacks, “…human life without 
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responsibility fails to do justice to human dignity…” (8).  Applying his 
covenantal model of relationship, the impact obligation and 
responsibility to intimate others has on the experience of illness can 
act as a catalyst to inspire willingness in the sick person to undergo 
and even embrace the process of re-memberment despite the 
uncertainty that is the earmark of chronic illness. 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illness as Shamanic Experience 
 While the idea of illness as a spiritually transformative 
experience is not novel, little focus has been given to illness as a 
specifically shamanic experience.  The significance of the shamanic 
experience of dismemberment and re-memberment applied to chronic 
illness is that it functions as a spiritual framework for the very real 
experience of physical dismemberment and acts as a potential guide to 
spiritual re-memberment even when the body may remain broken. 
 The shamanic initiation experience, as described by Mircea 
Eliade, is a narrative for the “wounded storyteller” that unlike the 
restitution narrative described by Frank, does not require restoration 
of the patient to a previous and no longer available state.  According 
to Eliade, the shaman‟s initiation experience of spiritual transformation 
is brought on by a crisis, often an illness or accident and is followed by 
a near death type of "out of body" experience that includes an 
experience of dismemberment.  Broken in spiritual body, the shaman 
experiences reintegration in a new self.  His or her bones are collected, 
fleshed with sinew and muscle and so he or she is “re-membered” and 
transformed.   The following account by Eliade describes the stages of 
initiation as follows: 
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 The important moments of a shamanic initiation are 
these five; first, torture and violent dismemberment of 
the body; second, scraping away of the flesh until the 
body is reduced to a skeleton; third, substitution of 
viscera and reveal of the blood; fourth, a period spent in 
Hell, during which the future shaman is taught by the 
souls of dead shamans and by 'demons'; fifth, an ascent 
to Heaven to obtain consecration from the God of 
Heaven (1994, 4). 
The shaman‟s story is neither pleasant nor triumphant in the sense 
that he does not rise unscathed by his experience.  Instead, he is like 
the biblical Jacob having wrestled with and been wounded by the 
stranger, only to discover he was wrestling with God, who changes his 
name to “Israel”, meaning he who wrestles with God and prevails 
(Genesis 32: 24-32).  Both figures carry with them and are defined 
spiritually by their wounds.  Theirs is not a story one takes up 
willingly, but it is a narrative for the wounded body that does not 
demand physical restoration but offers instead spiritual transformation.   
 Recalling an exacerbation caused by a lesion on my brainstem, 
the shaman‟s account elicits from me a sense of kinship with him and I 
hear in an account of my own dismemberment an echo of his own. 
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 At some point in the night, I have descended into the 
underworld.  I know because I have woken in Hell.  When I open 
my eyes the room spins violently counter-clockwise.  Placing my 
feet on the floor, I stand shaking my head in futile effort to clear 
the double images.  I list and capsize, falling to the floor retching 
and unable to lift myself out of the pool of my own vomit.  
 For months this spinning continues.  The lesion has 
wreaked havoc on my equilibrium.  My body does not know at 
any time where it is in space and I cannot navigate myself.  I 
have lost all direction.  I am unable to walk without falling, and 
to slow an image on which I wish to focus I must tilt into the 
spin, squinting to narrow the double image.  Daily I try this with 
my daughter‟s face hoping to settle on a single image of her to 
make eye contact with her so that she will know that she is seen 
by me.  When finally the whirlwind of images begins to slow and 
even after they have come to a halt, I find that I still do not 
know which way I am going.  I have lost my center. 
This is my dismemberment; disease has broken me.  My physical self 
has been wounded but my loss of center is my loss of self, the self I 
know, and with whom I had become comfortable, the one whose 
stories I know and told with ease.  My sense of loss is for this old 
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familiar self.  Who am I when she is gone?  I am not the self I was, 
admittedly, I did not even appreciate that girl until she was gone.   
 Illness for the shaman is an experience in which meaning and 
purpose can be found. From his experience he gains spiritual insight 
and the capacity to act as guide and healer to others.  To borrow 
Frank‟s language, he becomes the wounded healer. Similar to the 
shaman‟s spiritual encounter, through illness, the sick are 
dismembered physically, emotionally, and spiritually.  And like the 
shaman, the experience of dismemberment may be followed by re-
memberment from which they may emerge transformed.  The shaman 
in Eliade‟s account is transformed by his encounter with death, giving 
him the capacity and knowledge to communicate between the realms 
of life and death and the ability to heal others.  Having already made 
the journey into death, he is uniquely equipped to act as guide to 
those who do not yet know their way.  After similar encounter with 
death, the sick person I believe has the capacity, like the shaman, to 
be transformed by the experience and given new insight and the 
ability to share the fruits of this transfiguration with others. 
 Returning to my own experience, I find that my encounter with 
death was not only physical, but also spiritual.  The sense of self that 
was lost was my spiritual self and in order for me to be transformed 
rather than annihilated by that loss, I had to allow my former self to 
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die.  Like the Buddhist Zen master Hakuin‟s parable teaches, I had to 
release my hold over the abyss. 
 A man went astray and arrived at a spot which had never 
been trodden by the foot of man.  Before him there yawned a 
bottomless chasm.  His feet stood on the slippery moss of a rock 
and no secure foothold appeared around him.  He could step 
neither forward nor backward.  Only death awaited him.  The 
vine which he grasped with his left hand and the tendril which he 
held with his right hand could offer him little help.  His life hung 
as by a single thread.  Were he to release both hands at once, 
his dry bones would come to naught.  Thus it is with the Zen 
disciple.  By pursuing a single koan [spiritual puzzle which has 
no “rational” answer upon which one meditates seeking spiritual 
insight] he comes to a point where he is as if dead and his will as 
if extinguished.  This state is like a wide void over a deep chasm 
and no hold remains for hand or foot.  All thoughts vanish and in 
his bosom burns hot anxiety.  But then suddenly it occurs that 
with the koan both body and mind break.  This is the instant 
when the hands are released over the abyss.  In this sudden 
upsurge it is as if one drinks water and knows for oneself heat 
and cold.  Great joy wells up.  This is called rebirth (Heinrich, 
258-259). 
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My despair is authored by my inability to locate my self, to find 
meaning in my experience and to find the story that will make sense of 
my experience.  As Darrell Fasching writes, “the paradox is that one 
must will to plunge into that abyss, one must abandon oneself to 
despair and will one‟s own death.  The way to the great joy…is through 
the great death…” (1988, 95).  Giving in to that despair is the very act 
that releases me from it. 
  The shamanic narrative shifts the emphasis from a physical 
experience to a spiritual experience, from physical death to spiritual 
death.  Through the process of spiritual dismemberment and re-
memberment the shaman‟s story offers for the sick what the clinical 
cannot, the possibility of spiritual transformation (i.e., the discovery of 
meaning), even in the absence of physical renewal.  Just as language 
and story suggest that we are more than a physical body, chronic 
illness is more than a physical experience. 
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Conclusion 
I said to my soul, be still, and let the dark come upon you... T.S. Eliot 
 
 As I have indicated, my thesis argument is that in order to fully 
understand the nature of the illness experience, we must explore the 
spiritual dimension, for it is here that out of brokenness and despair 
we may experience rebirth. The spiritual component of the shaman‟s 
initiation experience provides clues for understanding illness as 
spiritually transformative even in the absence of physical healing, and 
is strengthened when coupled with a sense of obligation to intimate 
others. 
 The experience of chronic illness is the experience of darkness.  
Illness is a form of St. John of the Cross‟ Dark Night of the Soul and 
for those experiencing protracted illness, it is a series of many dark 
nights.  How to manage the darkness is to find meaning in the 
experience of it, to find that which is meaningful enough to allow us to 
trust the journey wherever it leads.  Each of the previous models for 
managing illness have provided some practical and even vital 
component for understanding illness and finding meaning in the 
experience. 
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 Clinical approaches to illness accomplish many things, in not only 
the curative, but also the palliative sense.  What they cannot do is 
address the spiritual and emotional sides of illness.  They do not have 
an answer for the contingent nature of the disease process, for the 
kind of suffering produced by uncertainty.  Mark Hanson in Pain 
Seeking Understanding points out that “to be human is to claim the 
contingencies of life, including and especially suffering, and to find 
meaning in the encounter with them” (181).  He goes on to say that 
”our very capacities to enter into a caring relationship with those who 
suffer are central to our moral lives and human identity” (181).  I 
think what Hanson articulates here is one of the critical reasons for 
rejecting any purely clinical model for addressing chronic illness.  
Medicine gives us clinical answers, but not necessarily fully human 
answers.  For that we must look beyond the physical.  We must seek 
out meaning in illness that will allow us to embrace contingency and 
suffering thereby exercising more fully our capacity as humans.   
 Therefore what I am suggesting is that the kind of answer we 
need is not one only concerned with the physical aspect of illness, but 
with how we become more fully human or retain our humanity in the 
presence of chronic illness and all that it entails. 
 Narrative medicine gives us room to understand illness in the 
context of individual life stories and a way for clinicians to embrace 
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more than the physical suffering of their patients.  Arthur Frank‟s work 
offers not only patients, but patient‟s bodies a voice through narrative, 
“injury becom[ing] the source of the potency of their stories” (xii).  
  With Frank, the sick can become wounded storytellers and 
wounded healers, but it is with the Shaman‟s initiation experience that 
we see a story the wounded can tell that articulates the way physical 
suffering can give birth to spiritual awakening or rebirth.  The shaman 
is the bridge between the realm of the living and the realm of the dead 
that for the shaman is where sacred ancestors reside.  What the 
shaman knows is that the living and the dead form one community 
and therefore, to quote Mitch Albom, author of Tuesday’s with Morrie, 
“death may end a life, but it does not end a relationship.” It is this 
relationship that will compel the sick to embrace the shaman‟s 
initiation and transformation through dismemberment and re-
memberment as their own.  This is the aspect I believe is missing from 
all of the other models and the aspect most crucial for compelling the 
sick to persevere through the dark night of chronic illness, through the 
myriad contingencies and unsettling state of uncertainty.  The only 
component sufficient to encourage this kind of commitment in the face 
of death is through the claim intimate others have on each other 
within the covenantal relationship in which we are responsible to 
someone beyond ourselves.  
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 For this reason, when I close my eyes to shut out pain or fear, 
the face and small voice of my daughter appear.  This is what she calls 
me to do.  As John Dunne suggests in The Way of All the Earth, 
consciousness projects an imagined path for our life, like a beacon 
guiding us through the darkness, but what gives us a sense of 
adventure is discovering the unexpected that lies ahead in the 
darkness.  It is the unexpected that overturns and transforms our 
understanding of who we are and what our life means and causes us 
to re-narrate our life story.  For we are always strangers to ourselves, 
who are more and other than we imagine ourselves to be. 
 Suffering, disappointment and death enrich us in unexpected 
ways.  So Dunne suggests we must “consent to both gifts, the light 
and the darkness…to share the light is to share insight…to share the 
darkness is to share the sense of [spiritual] adventure which goes with 
the darkness and the journey into the night” (210, 216-217). This 
journey is the journey we all must make, the one that leads inevitably 
to death but when embraced rather than struggled against leads to 
insight that is the spiritual transformation that transcends even death 
(Dunne, 208).  
 The following narrative account shares a moment in the dying of 
a young patient of mine many years ago.  When I reflected on this 
encounter, I was able to see how a narrative with which she was 
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familiar (“going to grandma‟s house”) helped her find meaning in what 
she was experiencing in her dying.  Along with that, I found traces of 
the shaman‟s experience in her final communications with her mother.   
 Before today, the last time I saw Emily was several weeks 
ago at her school.  She was tired. Cancer does that to a 
body…dying does that.  Still wanting to be with friends and 
teachers and to maintain some semblance of normalcy, her 
mother had reluctantly agreed to let her spend days or parts of 
days she felt up to it at school with her kindergarten class.  Her 
teachers had placed a mat, the blue plastic folding kind, on the 
floor in the napping room.  When I came to see her that day that 
is where I found her, laying on her side, her head haloed by 
downy blonde fuzz and resting on a tiny pillow that somehow 
managed to look large against her even smaller head.  Her eyes 
were closed and her respirations coming in slight shallow 
breaths.  I pulled another mat from nearby and lay down beside 
her.  Face to face, when she opened her eyes, we smiled at one 
another and I knew her time would be soon.  
 Today she seems even smaller.  I don‟t know how that can 
be, but her tiny frame is swallowed in her mother‟s embrace.  I 
think to myself that perhaps it should be.  I know when I see 
them there in each other‟s arms nestled in a chair that she is 
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nearly ready to die.  This ordinary scene of maternal comfort is 
shrouded in their shared lingering and longing and I wait.  
Speaking for the first time since I have arrived, she asks her 
mother, “Mommy, will you help me pack my bag?…I need to 
pack my bag.” Fat tears spill from her mother‟s eyes and fall on 
Emily‟s yellow flowered pajama‟s. Unsure what it means, her 
mother looks over at me and I smile a little, silently nodding my 
head urging her to follow along.  She carries Emily into her room 
to pack her pink suitcase with the words “going to grandma‟s” in 
big bubble letters.  Her mother puts her favorite books and 
pajamas in and tucks the blanket Emily holds out on top.  
Scooping her up she carries her back to the overstuffed chair, 
dragging the case behind her.  Settled once again, her mother 
stroking the fine wisps of her hair she says, “Ok Mommy…I‟m 
ready to go now.”  Fresh tears welling in her eyes, “Go?..Go 
where sweetheart?” her mother replies.  “On my trip…keep this 
for me, Mommy” she says taking her stuffed bunny from her 
own chest and pressing it to her mothers.  Closing her eyes, still 
holding her bunny to her mother‟s heart, Emily took her final 
breath.  
 Emily has stayed with me.  I often think of her and her 
encounter with death.  She understood her dying as a journey, a trip 
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she would make like the ones she had made to her grandmother‟s 
house.  So she packed her bag, taking the things she might need 
along with her, but also leaving something behind.  Packing her 
suitcase was a symbol of preparing for her death. Leaving the bunny, I 
think, was the symbol of the connection with her mother that would 
remain unbroken by her death.  Emily‟s story, like the one‟s told by 
Lorraine Hedtke and John Winslade in Re-Membering Lives:  
Conversations with the dying and the Bereaved, is not about 
“producing closure or completing unfinished business [but rather] 
about relationship going on and […] what might continue rather than 
what might be lost” (5).  The last conversation with her mother was 
anything but final.  Instead, it was an invitation to continue the 
conversation even in death.  As Hedtke and Winslade suggest, 
“remembering conversations can start long before death [in order to] 
construct a deliberate future that continues to include [a loved one]” 
(5-6).  Beginning those conversations in the way they describe makes 
a place for the dying person‟s “voice to carry on, […] to incorporate 
[their] voice […] and be responsible for carrying on its speaking” (7).  
Furthermore, the ongoing connection acts as a comfort to those with 
whom the dying are in relationship.   
 I too consider the possibility of constructing this conversation 
with my daughter as a way to prepare us both for the next crisis, for 
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even the final one.  She lays claim on my life, as do the others whom I 
love and who love me in return.  She whispers it there in the dark of 
death‟s night and I am compelled to respond.  Through my obligation 
to her, to those I love, I find meaning in what appears meaningless.  
My story becomes one of rebirth where what is born is not something 
separate from myself, but rather a new self, fledgling and tentative, 
subject still to the contingencies of my disease, to uncertainty…fully 
aware that to let go of my hold over the abyss is to embrace that 
darkness, to give myself over to it.  My efforts to exercise radical 
autonomy in the shadow of death are pursuits for control over an 
uncertain outcome, one beyond my control.  They are limited to the 
physical journey and not representative of the spiritual journey I am 
making in which I do not seek to control the journey, to shut out the 
darkness, but to trust it.  Entering the shaman‟s story, my death does 
not come as the end, the separation I fear.  Through my relationships 
the spiritual realms of life and death are bridged and my physical 
death, whenever it comes, need not, like the darkness, be feared or 
rejected, for death may end my life but not my relationships. 
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